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THE IMPACT OF BREXIT ON THE UK ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUND INDUSTRY





Following the 23 June 2016 referendum through which the British people have decided to leave the European Union and the 29 March 2017 notification to the European Council of the UK intention to withdraw from the Union, on 31 May 2017, ESMA published an opinion providing nine principles regarding the supervisory approach to be held by EU Countries’ Authorities in the event of relocations of entities, activities and/or functions from the UK to the other 27 Member States as a consequence of Brexit.
The opinion, entitled “General principles to support supervisory convergence in the context of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union”, looks like the first act of a “regulatory war” that the UK and the EU will “fight” in order, on the one hand, to keep in London, and, on the other, to attract to the other EU Countries, both financial players and their operations.
Obvioulsy such an opinion has an impact even on the alternative investment fund industry that in the EU, so far, has been mainly based in London.




	After the formalisation of Brexit,​[1]​ both the parties – the UK and the EU – have started getting ready for the negotiation phase which will be taking place in the next two years.
	Obviously, one of the most important components of such a negotiation will relate to the common market’s access for UK financial entities and products. Among them, alternative investment funds and alternative investment fund managers will attract a high degree of attention from both parties. Indeed, this sector of the financial system is particularly important for the UK since London has always been the main international financial centre for their activities. And, at the same time, one of the reasons for London being the world capital of alternative investment fund activities has been the free access on the wealthy EU market. This is why Brexit is likely to have a significant impact on the UK investment fund industry and for the same reason the UK negotiatiors should not underestimate the importance of the free access on the common market and of the delegation of functions to UK managers for the success of London as an international centre for investment fund activities.
	This article analyses the new EU regulation on the alternative investment fund managers and the way in which the UK legislator successefully transposed it into the domestic system and then focuses on the main possible scenarios which will materialise after Brexit, trying to contribute to the academic discussion about its impact on the British financial system.
	The article is divided in ten sections, after the introduction, section two is about the new EU legal framework for alternative investment fund managers; section three focuses on the main political and legislative reasons for the adoption of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive; section four analyses both aims and legal approach of such Directive; section five deals with its new rules, whilst section six discusses the way in which the UK legislator transposed it into the domestic system; section seven is an assessment of the UK alternative investment fund industry “health conditions” after the transposition of the Directive; section eight seeks to foresee the impact of Brexit on the British alternative investment fund industry, whilst section nine analyses the position recently taken by ESMA with regard to potential relocations of financial entities from the UK to the other 27 Member States as a consequence of Brexit; finally, section ten provides some concluding remarks.  

2. The EU legal framework for alternative investment funds and fund managers

In 2011, the EU legislator decided to radically change its regulatory approach with regard to the alternative investment fund industry. Until that moment, there was no Union legislation governing the activities of alternative investment funds and alternative investment fund managers, and therefore the EU Member States were free to regulate or not this relevant sector of the financial system.​[2]​ Accordingly, often these activities and the firms performing them were unregulated or very “lightly” regulated and in any case the rules applied only at national level.​[3]​
Taking benefit of this regulatory “void”, some EU Countries had become important international financial centres for both managing and marketing alternative investment funds. Among these, the UK was (and still is) the most important.​[4]​
Mainly due to the crisis and as a legislative response to it, in June 2011, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the so-called Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter AIFMD)​[5]​ with the aim to harmonise the regulation of both the management and marketing of alternative investment funds in the Union.​[6]​

3. The political and legislative reasons for the adoption of the AIFMD

The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 had increased the conviction that it was necessary to rethink the regulatory framework governing the financial markets. This conviction was based on the perception of the need to regulate and oversee the so-called “shadow banking system”, which would include, among others, alternative investment funds such as structured investment vehicles, private equity funds​[7]​ and hedge funds.​[8]​ 
Those in favour of this new regulatory approach argued that the financial crisis had shown that risks can move easily and quickly from one financial sector to another, and then spread around the global system. This has been made easier as result of the activity of alternative investment fund managers.​[9]​
Therefore, even though the global financial crisis was not deemed to have been caused by the managers of alternative investment funds,​[10]​ policy makers remained concern about their capability to spread the risks accross the system,​[11]​ and this concern was amplified by the extremely large size of the sector.​[12]​  
This political view was supported by the several countries of continental Europe, including Germany, France and Italy, whilst the UK, according to its more liberal and business-friendly legislative approach, did not support the argument of the need to make these financial players subject to more regulation and supervision. This is because their activities usually do not involve retail investors.​[13]​ The UK Government, in particular, feared that the new regulation could lead many managers away from the EU to other less regulated jurisdictions.​[14]​
Despite the opposition of the British Government, however, the Directive was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on 8 June 2011.​[15]​
4. The aim of the Directive and its legislative approach

The aim of the AIFMD is to increase and harmonise at EU level the regulation on the management​[16]​ and marketing​[17]​ to professional investors​[18]​ of alternative investment funds (AIFs)​[19]​ and the national and cross-border supervision of their managers (AIFMs).​[20]​ 
To do so, the AIFMD has firstly introduced common requirements governing the authorisation of the AIFMs,​[21]​ whilst the increase of the cross-border supervision is due to the new transnational operation perspectives given by the Directive itself through the introduction of a Passport regime​[22]​ allowing the managers of such funds to carry out freely their activities also in other Member States.​[23]​ 
The result has been not only to have in place a harmonised and stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for these activities within the Union,​[24]​ but also a continental integrated market for alternative investment funds.​[25]​
It is also worth noting that the AIFMD does not directly regulate the AIFs, which, therefore, continue to be subject to the internal rules of each Member State and to be supervised by the national Authorities. Indeed, the legal definition of AIFs is used just in order to identify their managers, who, in turn, are subject to the new regulation.​[26]​ The reason why the EU legislator used this approach is due to the fact that it was considered disproportionate to regulate the structure and/or composition of the portfolios of such funds at Union level due to their large variety.​[27]​  
Even though the reasons for this legislative choice are quite simple to understand,​[28]​ at the same time, it is obvious that such approach can encourage regulatory arbitrage, addressing managers in the choice of their jurisdiction. It is likely that they will choose EU Countries where the regulation of the funds are more lenient and business-friendly in order to establish both themselves and their investment funds, given that the burdens and the benefits introduced by the Directive are the same in all the EU Countries.​[29]​
The scope of the AIFMD is broad as it applies: (1) to all EU AIFMs​[30]​ managing EU AIFs​[31]​ or non-EU AIFs,​[32]​ irrespective of whether or not they are marketed in the Union; (2) to non-EU AIFMs managing EU AIFs, irrespective of whether or not they are marketed in the Union; and, (3) to non-EU AIFMs marketing EU AIFs or non-EU AIFs in the Union.​[33]​ 
This also means that the Directive impacts third-country entities, since it applies even to non-EU AIFMs​[34]​ that operate in the Union and indirectly to non-EU AIFs managed by EU AIFMs or marketed in the Union by EU AIFMs or non-EU AIFMs. In fact, even non-EU AIFMs interested in managing EU AIFs or in marketing AIFs (both EU and non-EU) in the Union with a passport must be authorised by the Authorities of the Member States. But the benefit that they can obtain by being subjected to the EU regulation is relevant and is represented by the possibility to access directly the entire EU market.​[35]​
From the marketing perspective, the Directive gives the non-EU AIFMs two different possibilities to access the EU market: (1) with the EU passport; or, (2) through the national private placement regimes.​[36]​ In the first case – which is not yet available but could be implemented in the future – the non-EU AIFM needs to be authorized by the EU Authorities, whilst in the second one the authorization is not requested having the managers to comply with the domestic regulation of the country where they want to operate.​[37]​

5. The rules of the Directive

The rules introduced by the AIFMD relate to the authorization of the AIFMs,​[38]​ their obligations of compliance, conduct of business,​[39]​ capital requirements, conflicts of interest, custody of the funds’ assets entrusted to an independent depositary,​[40]​ the valuation procedures of these assets​[41]​ and, above all, the passport regime, that can be considered as a “reward” to balance these expensive regulatory burden.​[42]​ This passport, indeed, gives the managers (in the future maybe also non-EU managers)​[43]​ the opportunity to carry out freely the activities of management and marketing to professional investors of AIFs (in the future maybe also non-EU AIFs)​[44]​ accross the EU territory.​[45]​
The introduction of these new rules can be seen as a direct regulation of the managers and an indirect regulation of the funds.​[46]​
From a different perspective, it is possible to argue that in order to create a clear and understandable EU-wide regulatory framework and an efficient supervisory system, the AIFMD has established that the AIFMs, in primis, must be authorized​[47]​ to operate by the supervisory authority of their Member State, and, in secundis, have to provide potential investors with different types of information about: (1) the investment strategies and their objectives; (2) the valuation policies of the assets; (3) the procedures for the redemption of the units or shares; (4) the custody of the assets; (5) the procedures for the risk management; and, (6) the remuneration policies of the management.​[48]​
From the regulatory point of view, the AIFMD shows some similarities​[49]​ with the UCITS Directive,​[50]​ particularly, with regard to the working structure of the AIFs, given that it is built on the basis of the so called “investment triangle model”, characterising also the Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securities, where the three corners are represented by: 1) the investors, 2) the asset manager, 3) the depositary-custodian,​[51]​ with the fund itself that is in the centre.​[52]​ This means that the asset manager decides the investment strategies and the depositary holds the assets on behalf of the fund and in order to grant more protection to the investors.​[53]​ 

6. The transposition of the AIFMD in the UK

	Despite the opposition towards the adoption of the Directive, the UK legislator transposed it into the internal system by issuing the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations 2013, (so-called Regulations 2013).​[54]​ The Regulations 2013, in particular, has introduced in the domestic law the new categories of AIFs and AIFMs created by the Directive and amended a number of other legislation, including the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and the Regulated Activities Order 2001 (RAO 2001).​[55]​
Regulation 3 of the Regulations 2013 adopts the same definition of AIF​[56]​ provided by the AIFMD, specifying that “an AIF may be open-ended or closed-ended, and constituted in any legal form, including under a contract, by means of a trust or under statute”.​[57]​
Regulation 4, instead, provides the definition of AIFM, as “a legal person, the regular business of which is managing one or more AIFs”. The AIFM of an AIF, according to the same article, “may be either: (a) another person appointed by or on behalf of the AIF and which through that appointment is responsible for managing the AIF (“external AIFM”); or (b) where the legal form of the AIF permits internal management and where the AIF’s governing body chooses not to appoint an external AIFM, the AIF itself (“internal AIFM”)”.​[58]​
		The same regulation, additionally, describes the activity of managing AIFs as performing at least risk management or portfolio management for the AIF; whilst, about the marketing of units or shares of AIFs, regulation 45 states that “an AIFM markets an AIF when the AIFM makes a direct or indirect offering or placement of units or shares of an AIF managed by it to or with an investor domiciled or with a registered office in an EEA State, or when another person makes such an offering or placement at the initiative of, or on behalf of, the AIFM”.​[59]​	
The impact of the new UK legislation on the AIFMs is relevant, given that, before the transposition of the AIFMD, according to the FSMA 2000 and the RAO 2001, the managers of investment funds other than UCITSs had to be authorised by the FSA,​[60]​ now FCA,​[61]​ simply for carrying on some of the following specified activities, depending on the business model: dealing as principal, arranging deals in investments, management functions or investment advice.​[62]​
Now, due to the transposition of the AIFMD, instead, the activity of “managing an AIF” is treated as a regulated activity under the FSMA 2000 and the RAO 2001 in the same way as the activity of “mananging a UCITS”.​[63]​
This is due to the fact that section 19 of FSMA 2000 provides a general prohibition precluding anyone other than an authorised person or an exempt person from carrying on regulated activities and to the fact that the RAO 2001, as amended by the Regulations 2013, now qualifies “managing an AIF”​[64]​ as a reserved activity. As a consequence the entities wanting to carry on such activity need to be authorised by the FCA for “managing an AIF”.​[65]​
The new UK regulatory framework represents a significant change, given that many managers, who before the transposition of the AIFMD were authorised for managing investment, had to apply in order to be re-authorised for “managing an AIF”.​[66]​




7. The UK alternative investment fund industry after the adoption and transposition of the AIFMD

	Despite the strong opposition of the British Government against the adoption of the AIFMD, even after its transposition into the domestic system, the UK has maintained its international leading position as a financial centre for the management and marketing of alternative investment funds.​[69]​ Indeed, due to the introduction of the AIFMD passport, the British industry has increased its size benefiting from the new opportunities to freely access the market of the other Member States.​[70]​
	Following the adoption of the AIFMD, it is possible to distinguish two different ways for UK-based AIFMs to access the market of the other EU Member States.​[71]​ 
The first one is through the passport under articles 32​[72]​ and 33​[73]​ of the AIFMD. This is the case in which UK AIFMs manage UK or EU AIFs and sell their units domestically as well as in the other EU Countries. The data published by ESMA has confirmed that many UK AIFMs have been using massively the EU AIFMD passport since its introduction by managing AIFs established in other EU Countries and by selling units of AIFs, both established in the UK and in other EU Countries, either domestically or in the other 27 Member States.​[74]​
The second one is under article 36 of the AIFMD​[75]​ and is the case in which UK AIFMs manage and sell in the EU Countries units of AIFs established in jurisdictions outside the EU, mainly the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands,​[76]​ on the basis of the so-called private placement regime of the EU Countries in question.​[77]​
The data concerning the activities of non-EU AIFMs and non-EU AIFs in the Union, published by ESMA, confirms that the UK is the favoured gateway for non-EU entities to access the EU market.​[78]​ 

8. Brexit potential impact on the British alternative investment fund sector

	After the official exit of the UK from the European Union,​[79]​ there could be three alternative scenarios with regard to the access of UK financial entities on the common market.​[80]​ 
In the first scenario, the UK could decide to maintain its status of European Economic Area (EEA) Country.​[81]​ In such a case, British AIFMs and AIFs can continue to benefit from the EU AIFMD passport since it is granted to both EU and EEA entities.​[82]​ 
In the second scenario, if the UK does not maintain its European Economic Area (EEA) Country status, it will be considered as a third country. As a consequence, its AIFMs and AIFs will have to wait for the decision of the Commission regarding the extension of the AIFMD passport to non-EU AIFMs and AIFs. From this perspective, if the domestic regulation will not be changed, the UK could obtain a positive assessment from ESMA since its regulation is set on the basis of the AIFMD so it should be considered as equivalent. This, in turn, could speed up and ease the legislative process managed by the Commission to grant to the UK the third country passport under the AIFMD.
The third scenario could be that the UK will negotiate a specific agreement with the Union allowing British financial entities to access the EU market.​[83]​
However, assuming that after Brexit the parties do not reach a specific agreement allowing UK financial players to freely access the common market as has been so far and at the same time that the UK will not maintain its status of EEA Country,​[84]​ then the free access of the EU market with the AIFMD passport will cease to be available.​[85]​ The reason is that so far the EU passport has been given just to EU and EEA entities.​[86]​ UK-based AIFMs and AIFs after Brexit will lose their current status as EU entities, simoultaneously losing also the benefit of the passport under the current rules.​[87]​
On the opposite, the access of the EU Countries’ market under the so-called private placement regime can still occur even if on the basis of the provisions of article 42 of the AIFMD​[88]​ instead of article 36.​[89]​ This means that from this perspective there will not be significant adverse regulatory changes.​[90]​
In such a context, the day after Brexit, the UK alternative investment fund industry, relying on the total conformity of its legislation to the EU rules, can hope to be considered over time as an equivalent system. The benefit of being considered as an equivalent third country would be the availability for its financial entities of a centralised authorisation process. In other words, firms based in equivalent third countries are exempted from national authorisations with the legal effect that they would not need to open a subsidiary in the EU to operate in the common market.​[91]​ 
However, the main problem is represented by the fact that the third country equivalence regime is available just in a limited number of EU legislation with the consequence that this benefit cannot be enjoyed in any sector of the financial system.​[92]​ 
But even more importantly the decision of giving the equivalence “label” to a third country is mainly a political choice made by the Commision on the basis of the technical assesment performed by the relevant European Supervisory Authority.​[93]​ And from this point of view the current harshness of the negotiations between the EU and the UK obvioulsy could influence the Commission’s position,​[94]​ making it very difficult for the latter to get such a recognition.​[95]​ 

9. The position of ESMA 

	The difficulty in obtaining the required recognition by the Commission discussed in the previous section seems to be confirmed by the position recently taken by ESMA. 
The point is that Brexit could be an incentive for UK-based alternative investment fund managers and alternative investment funds to relocate in one or more of the other 27 EU Countries in order to keep benefiting from the passport under the AIFMD.
	ESMA is afraid that such a situation can end up persuading the regulators of the other 27 Member States to lower the level of regulation (what can be defined as a “race to the bottom”) in order to attract the UK financial entities wishing to move away from London.​[96]​
	The second ESMA’s concern – that is actually very connected to the first one – relates to the cases of delegation and outsourcing. Many UK-based managers might want to set up a management company in the EU and simoultaneously delegate and/or outsource back to the UK-based entity most of the activities. Such a structure would allow to keep the core part of the financial activities in the UK and at the same time benefit from the passport through the EU-based vehicle. It is obvious that ESMA is concerned about such a risk which would materialise an evident circumvention of the main EU principles, namely the so-called four freedoms.​[97]​ 
As a response to these concerns, ESMA published an opinion, setting out nine principles, that actually looks like a regulatory “attack” to the UK financial system.​[98]​ These nine principles are: 1) no automatic recognition of existing authorisations; 2) authorisations granted by EU27 NCAs should be rigorous and efficient; 3) NCAs should be able to verify the objective reasons for relocation; 4) special attention should be granted to avoid letter-box entities in the EU27; 5) outsourcing and delegation to third countries is only possible under strict conditions; 6) NCSa should ensure that substance requirements are met; 7) NCAs should ensure sound governance of EU entities; 8) NCAs must be in a position to effectively supervise and enforce Union law; 9) coordination to ensure effective monitoring by ESMA. ​[99]​
This hostile attitude clearly emerges from the tone and the language used as well as from its very purpose which is to provide a set of guidelines for the Member States’ Authorities to specifically manage the relationships between supervisors and supervised entities of both the EU Countries and the UK in the post-Brexit scenario.​[100]​
Accordingly there are a number of unnecessary remarks highlighting the ESMA’s “punitive” approach. This is what can be derived from obvious and redundant statements uselessly pointing out that the new “authorisations must be granted in full compliance with Union law and in a coherent manner across the EU27”​[101]​ and that “any outsourcing or delegation arrangement from entities authorised in the EU27 to third country entities should be strictly framed and consistently supervised. Outsourcing or delegation arrangements, under which entities confer either a substantial degree of activities or critical functions to other entities, should not result in those entities becoming letter-box entities”.​[102]​ Of the same nature are the principles remarking that there will be no automatic recognition of the existing authorisations of UK financial entities in the other EU Member States and that the authorisation process conducted by the Member States’ authorities should be rigorous; whilst the argument that the process of authorisation takes time and therefore entities seeking to relocate should approach the EU authorities as early as possible looks even more threatening.​[103]​
  Indeed, there is no need to specify that the authorisation process must be run according to the Union law and that outsourcing and delegation arrangements cannot end up making the entities that delegate and outsource activities “empty boxes” without real functions and operations. These are notorious regulatory principles of the EU financial law which have always applied regardless of Brexit.
The ESMA’s need of highlighting these well-known principles appears to be a “call to arms” addressed to the EU national competent authorities aimed at making increasingly more difficult and burdensome for UK-based financial entities access the common market after Brexit. And this is likely to arise from the political aim of not allowing the UK to be better off after Brexit, since this can become an incentive for other EU Countries to follow in its footsteps. 




10. Concluding remarks 

	The UK has been so far the EU country which has benefited the most from the introduction of the AIFMD passport. This is confirmed by the data published by ESMA.​[104]​
	Of course, it could be argued that the main business model is the one with UK AIFMs managing non-EU AIFs. And such a model currently does not allow the use of the passport.​[105]​ This would mean that the exit from the EU and the consequent loss of the AIFMD passport benefits would not be such a big deal for the UK alternative investment fund industry.
	However, the impossibility to freely access the EU market along with a likely increase of regulation and supervision with regard to the delegation and/or outsource of management functions to UK AIFMs could represent a significant threat for the sector. 
	This concern lies on the consideration that many UK financial entities authorised either under MiFID​[106]​ or under AIFMD perform a huge amount of activities as managers delegated by other EU UCITS companies or EU AIFMs.​[107]​ Any limitation on the ability of EU managers (both UCITS and AIFMs) to delegate and/or outsource portfolio management and/or risk management functions to UK entities could severely impact the British AIF industry.




(Professor of Banking and Financial Law – Queen Mary University of London)
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